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1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics is
based at Fordham University School of Law and
sponsors programs, develops publications, supports
scholarship on contemporary issues of law and
ethics, and encourages professional and public
institutions to integrate moral perspectives into
their work. Over the past decade, the Stein Center
and affiliated Fordham Law faculty have examined
the ethical dimensions of the administration of
criminal justice, including the ethical and historical
dimensions of the death penalty and execution
methods. The Stein Center has submitted amicus
briefs in three prior cases in which this Court has
been asked to examine methods of execution: Bryan
v. Moore, 528 U.S. 960 (1999), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000), which
the Court had granted to consider whether
electrocution violated the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause; Baze v.
Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), in which this Court
examined the constitutionality of lethal injection as
implemented in Kentucky and in which this Court
cited the Stein Center brief; and Glossip v. Gross,

Pursuant to Rule 37.3, the parties have consented to
the filing of this brief. Letters of consent have been filed
with the Clerk. No counsel for a party authored this brief
in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amicus
curiae, its members, or its counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
1
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135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), in which this Court examined
Oklahoma’s implementation of lethal injection.
Implementation of lethal injection as a method of
execution implicates ethical questions important to
the Stein Center.
The evolution of execution
methods in the United States generally suggests a
public consensus opposed to the infliction of severe
pain and suffering in the course of executing
individuals sentenced to death. At the same time, it
is doubtful whether in practice execution methods
achieve that goal. In the context of lethal injection,
there are serious concerns whether prison officials,
legislators, and courts have responded to the risks
associated with the implementation of lethal
injection in an ethical manner.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In recent years, this Court has been asked to
review the constitutionality of lethal injection
protocols on numerous occasions. Such review has
resulted in necessary judicial scrutiny of the most
severe punishment a State may inflict. This case
concerns the ability of courts to continue to perform
this essential judicial function.
Arkansas (and
separately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, Arthur v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 16-15549, 2016 WL 6500595 (11th Cir.
Nov. 2, 2016), cert. pet. filed No. 16-602) wrongly
understood this Court’s decisions in Baze and
Glossip to foreclose judicial review of the
constitutionality of a State’s chosen execution
method and protocol unless the State already
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authorizes another method to which the inmate may
point as a feasible and readily available alternative.
This Court should reject this impermissible
narrowing of the scope of judicial review of the
constitutionality of execution methods.
(1)
State
legislatures
repeatedly
have
demonstrated a willingness to adopt and retain
methods of executions that violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. For this reason, this Court has long
recognized a right to meaningful judicial review of
the constitutionality of execution methods.
(2) The Arkansas legislature initially delegated
every detail for carrying out lethal injection
executions to the state department of corrections.
Decades later, the Arkansas Supreme Court
determined that this delegation of authority violated
the separation of powers doctrine, and the
legislature subsequently narrowed the method-ofexecution statute.
Now, only four years after
requiring the legislature to identify with specificity
the State’s execution method, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has interpreted this Court’s decisions in Baze
and Glossip to limit the alternate execution methods
on which an inmate may rely to show a
constitutional violation to those methods already
identified in the statute. The Arkansas Supreme
Court reached this result notwithstanding the lower
court’s finding that the State’s midazolam protocol
may have posed a substantial risk of intolerable
pain. By interpreting Baze and Glossip in this
manner, Arkansas has insulated its execution
method statute from judicial review.
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(3) This Court’s decisions foreclose such an
approach. Baze and Glossip nowhere require a
statutory alternative but require only that such an
alternative be feasible.
The need for uniform
application of federal constitutional law precludes
such an approach, which would fracture Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence by allowing an inmate to
succeed in challenging an unnecessarily painful
method of execution in one State but not another. If
the Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation is not
reversed, a State legislature will not only be
permitted to select the most painful and barbaric
method of execution, but it also will be able to
prevent constitutional review by limiting the
available options to those selected by the legislature.
This Court should grant the Petition and
summarily reverse.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT CONSISTENTLY HAS
RECOGNIZED A RIGHT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW
TO
ENSURE
THAT
EXECUTION METHODS COMPORT
WITH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Historically, State legislatures have moved
toward the adoption of new execution methods as a
result of a growing consensus that the prior methods
posed a risk of unnecessary cruelty or lingering
death. Judicial review has played an important role,
serving as a catalyst for movement toward more
humane methods of execution.
Given the
importance of judicial review to ensuring the
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constitutionality of execution methods, this Court
has long recognized the right to meaningful Eighth
Amendment review.
A.

Historically,
State
Legislatures
Have
Approved
Painful
And
Barbaric Methods Of Execution

Today, all States that provide for capital
punishment use lethal injection as their exclusive or
primary means of execution. See Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 42 (2008). Before lethal injection became
the preferred method of execution, States employed
a number of methods ultimately deemed inhumane.
But each time a State moved toward a method of
execution thought more humane, experience showed
the new method resulted in intolerable pain and
suffering.
Hanging.
In the mid-nineteenth century,
hanging was the “nearly universal” method of
execution in the United States. Campbell v. Wood,
511 U.S. 1119, 144 S. Ct. 2125, 2125 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
Although hanging initially was perceived as
humane, it proved in practice to result in deaths
through slow strangulation or decapitation. Id. at
2127 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Hanging . . . is a
crude and imprecise practice . . . .”). By the late
1800s, hanging had fallen out of favor after the
public observed brutally botched hangings involving
decapitations, strangulations, and in some instances,
a failure to kill. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 172–75 (2003). As
a result, State legislatures sought a “less barbarous”
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manner of execution. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
444 (1890).
Electrocution. By the early twentieth century,
numerous States had replaced hanging with
electrocution as their primary means of execution,
driven by the “well grounded belief that electrocution
is less painful and more humane than hanging.”
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 185 (1915).
Beginning with the first electrocution, however,
State-sanctioned electrocutions routinely resulted in
unnecessary pain and lingering death. See BANNER,
supra, at 186; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and
What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 73–74 &
n.55 (2002) (describing the first person to be
executed by electrocution as burning and bleeding
during the procedure). After years of increased
public awareness of the pain and gore resulting from
botched electrocutions,2 the Georgia Supreme Court
held electrocution violated its State constitution. See
Dawson v. State, 554 S.E.2d 137, 139 (Ga. 2001)
(recognizing that whether a particular punishment
is cruel and unusual hinges on “evolving standards

See Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary:
How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 62–63 (2007) (describing 1999
botched execution of Allen Lee Davis, who suffered deep
burns, bleeding, and partial asphyxiation from a mouth
strap installed in the electric chair).
2
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of decency” (citation omitted)).3
The Nebraska
Supreme Court followed suit, reasoning that
“[e]lectrocution’s proven history of burning and
charring bodies is inconsistent with both the
concepts of evolving standards of decency and the
dignity of man.” State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278
(Neb. 2008).
After a particularly grisly execution in the 1990s,
this Court granted certiorari to assess the
constitutionality of electrocution in Florida. See
generally Bryan, 528 U.S. at 960. Soon after,
however, the Florida legislature amended the State’s
method of execution, permitting a prisoner to choose
to be executed by lethal injection instead of by
electrocution. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105 (2000);
2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2000-2 (West). This
Court therefore dismissed the writ in light of the
statutory amendments.
See generally Bryan v.
Moore, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
Lethal Gas. In 1921, the Nevada legislature
became the first State to authorize lethal gas as the
State’s method of execution, explaining that the
State “sought to provide a method of inflicting the
death penalty in the most humane manner known to
modern science.” State v. Gee Jon, 211 P. 676, 682
(Nev. 1923).4 A prisoner executed by this method
The Georgia legislature already had abolished
electrocution as a means of execution for offenses
committed after May 1, 2000. Dawson, 554 S.E.2d at 144.
3

Ten other States adopted lethal gas as a means of
execution by 1955. See Denno, supra, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at
83.
4
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would sit in an enclosed chamber to be filled with
lethal gas and remain in the chamber until death
occurred. See Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048, 1058
(5th Cir. 1983). In practice, prisoners did not always
die peacefully; often they moaned, gasped for air,
and convulsed for periods longer than ten minutes
before dying.
See id. at 1058–59 (describing
eyewitness accounts of gas chamber executions);
Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions
Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319, app. 2.B at
424–28 (1997) (similar).
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit held that lethal gas
executions, as authorized by California’s method of
execution statute, were unconstitutional. See Fierro
v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing the
district court’s findings that lethal gas executions
would result in extreme pain), vacated on other
grounds, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). This Court did not
address the constitutionality of lethal gas execution;
instead, it vacated the judgment and remanded the
case in light of an amendment to California’s statute,
which made lethal injection the default method of
execution unless the prisoner chose lethal gas. See
generally Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). On
remand, the Ninth Circuit agreed the inmate no
longer
had
standing
to
challenge
the
constitutionality of the lethal gas method of
execution. See Fierro v. Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158,
1160 (9th Cir. 1998). Subsequently, this Court held
that a prisoner had waived a challenge to the
constitutionality of lethal gas as an execution
method by declining the newly adopted option of
execution by lethal injection.
See Stewart v.
LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999).
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Lethal Injection.
Although certain States
moved toward lethal gas, other States transitioned
to lethal injection. In the 1970s, following the end of
a nine-year execution hiatus while this Court
considered the constitutionality of the death penalty,
Oklahoma became the first State to adopt lethal
injection as a method of execution. Baze, 553 U.S. at
41–42. Certain States quickly followed suit with
Texas adopting lethal injection a day after
Oklahoma. Baze, 553 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Denno, supra, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. at 78. Nebraska finally abandoned
electrocution in favor of lethal injection only in 2009
after
the
Nebraska
Supreme
Court
held
electrocution unconstitutional under the State
constitution. Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection
Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1341 cht.1,
1342 (2014).
From the start, lethal injection proved unlike the
tranquil form of execution many envisioned. Early
observers reported “violent[] gagg[ing],” collapsing
veins, convulsing, and, in one particularly gruesome
instance, “after a lengthy search for an adequate
vein, the syringe came out of [the prisoner’s] vein,
spewing
deadly
chemicals
toward
startled
witnesses.” See Denno, supra, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. at
app. 1 at 139–41 tbl.9 (citation omitted).
The problems with lethal injection executions
persisted over the years.
Inmates challenged
protocols implementing lethal injection, with limited
success. See, e.g., Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp.
2d 1037, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 438 F.3d 926
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding undue risk existed that an
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inmate would remain conscious during the
administration of the latter two drugs in the
protocol, which neither side disputed would result in
him suffering intense pain); State v. Rivera, No.
04CR065940, 2008 WL 2784679, slip op. at 1, 9
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008) (emphasizing that
“the use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol
(pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride)
creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that the
condemned will experience an agonizing and painful
death”). In 2014, it took Oklahoma prison officials
almost an hour to establish intravenous access in the
execution of Clayton Lockett and Lockett began to
speak and move after officials thought he had been
rendered unconscious. See Glossip, 135. S. Ct. at
2734.
States specifically have experienced problems
implementing protocols using midazolam as the first
drug in a lethal injection procedure. In Ohio’s
execution of Dennis McGuire, McGuire “gasped and
convulsed for ten to thirteen minutes and took
twenty-four minutes to die.” See Eric Berger, Lethal
Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due
Process, 55 B.C.L. REV. 1367, 1387 (2014). Arizona
conducted a two-hour execution using midazolam in
which the inmate, Joseph Wood, gasped 600 times
before dying. Id. Oklahoma’s execution of inmate
Michael Lee Wilson using a midazolam protocol
resulted in witnesses describing how Wilson cried
out during his execution, “I feel my whole body
burning!” Id. at 1385.
Despite the well-documented problems with
methods of execution that cause unconstitutional
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degrees of pain and suffering—and explicit findings
of unconstitutionality as to such methods by a
variety of courts—many States still sanction these
methods. Despite the holding that electrocution has
a “proven history of burning and charring bodies,”
Mata, 745 N.W.2d at 278, seven States still permit
execution by electrocution in certain circumstances.
Cert. Pet. 12 n.7.
Despite the Ninth Circuit
affirming a district court’s conclusion that lethal gas
causes an “inmate [to] suffer intense, visceral pain,
primarily as a result of lack of oxygen,” Fierro, 77
F.3d at 308, four States authorize lethal gas as an
alternate method of execution. Id. Thus, States
have indicated a willingness to permit by law the
implementation of the death penalty through painful
and barbaric methods of execution.
B.

This Court Recognizes A Prisoner’s
Right To Meaningful Judicial
Review Of The Constitutionality Of
Execution Methods

Although State legislatures historically have
adopted painful and barbaric execution methods,
this Court established long ago the ability of courts
to review the constitutionality of the implementation
of the death penalty. Litigation in recent years has
served only to confirm this constitutional
responsibility, as this Court has affirmed an
individual’s right to judicial review of the method of
his impending execution.
In 1890, this Court first reviewed execution by
electrocution, allowing New York to conduct the first
electrocution based in part on New York’s
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articulated motivation of finding a more humane
method of execution. See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447–
49. A century later, as discussed supra, this Court
agreed to examine the constitutionality of
electrocution after a particularly gruesome execution
in Florida. See Bryan, 528 U.S. 960, writ dismissed
as improvidently granted, 528 U.S. 1133 (2000).
Five years after Bryan, this Court permitted a
prisoner in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004),
to challenge the planned use of a cut-down
procedure—a painful and invasive way to establish
intravenous access—in advance of his lethal
injection execution. Id. at 642–46. Two years later,
this Court held that prisoners could challenge State
lethal injection protocols under Section 1983. See
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006). Both
Nelson and Hill confirmed that an individual has the
right to challenge the constitutionality of his method
of execution.
In 2008, this Court decided Baze, which involved
a challenge to Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol.
Kentucky’s protocol mandated that a prisoner be
injected with a three-drug sequence: a barbiturate
intended to induce unconsciousness, followed by a
paralytic agent and then a drug designed to cause
cardiac arrest. Baze, 553 U.S. at 45. The petitioner
in Baze asserted that the latter two drugs would
result in serious pain if the first, sodium thiopental,
were improperly administered, causing the inmate to
remain conscious during the execution. Id. at 49. As
an alternative, the petitioner proposed that
Kentucky adopt a one-drug protocol consisting of
only sodium thiopental. Id. at 51. This Court held
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the petitioner had not shown that the risk of serious
harm was “substantial” because it was unlikely that
the executioner would administer an inadequate
dose of sodium thiopental given the safeguards in
Kentucky’s protocol. Id. at 56. In that regard, the
risk of harm was not “objectively intolerable”
because no State had ever used the one-drug
alternative offered by the prisoner, and the inmate
did not offer a study showing a one-drug protocol
would be equally effective. Id. at 53, 57. This Court
further held that Kentucky’s failure to remove the
paralytic agent from its protocol was not cruel and
unusual. Id. at 57–58 (noting that the State has an
interest in preserving the dignity of the procedure).
In Baze, this Court outlined for the first time a
“feasible” and “readily implemented” standard for
execution alternatives.
This Court held that,
although “the Constitution does not demand the
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out
executions,” id. at 47, challengers will prevail if
there is a “substantial risk of serious harm” or an
“objectively intolerable risk of harm” that “prevents
prison officials from pleading that they were
subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment,” id. at 50.
In such cases, the
alternative procedure must be “feasible, readily
implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a
substantial risk of severe pain.” Id. at 52. The Baze
Court placed no restrictions on the types of execution
alternatives that a claimant may plead, nor did it
limit possible alternatives to those that the State has
statutorily approved. Rather, this Court concluded
that, if a State “refuses to adopt such an alternative
in the face of these documented advantages, without
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a legitimate penological justification for adhering to
its current method of execution, then a State’s
refusal to change its method can be viewed as ‘cruel
and unusual’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at
52.
Glossip reaffirmed Baze’s “feasible” and “readily
implemented” standard, reiterating that prisoners
must establish that the method is very likely to
cause needless suffering to successfully challenge a
method of execution. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737.
The Glossip Court considered an Eighth Amendment
challenge to Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection
protocol. The Oklahoma protocol at issue called for
the administration of (1) midazolam, a sedative,
followed by (2) a paralytic agent, and (3) potassium
chloride. See id. at 2734. The petitioner in Glossip
specifically challenged the use of midazolam,
asserting that there was a substantial risk that the
required 500-milligram dose would not prevent him
from feeling the painful effects of the potassium
chloride and paralytic agent. Id. at 2740. Experts
testified that midazolam has a “ceiling effect” after
which point any marginal increase in dosage would
prove ineffective in inducing unconsciousness,
subjecting the prisoner to severe pain when prison
officials administered the latter two drugs. Id. at
2743.
Nonetheless, this Court held that the petitioner
had not made an adequate showing of a substantial
risk of pain because he had failed to put forth
testimony that the “ceiling effect” occurs below the
500-milligram dose required by the protocol. Id.
This Court further held that the alternative
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sedatives
proposed,
sodium
thiopental
and
pentobarbital, were unavailable to the State because
they had been removed entirely from the market.
Id. at 2733–34, 2738. Just as in Baze, the Glossip
Court never limited prisoners challenging the
method to certain categories of alternatives or to
state-approved alternatives. Instead, this Court
noted that a claimant is required only “to plead and
prove a known and available alternative.” Id. at
2739.
Under Baze and Glossip, and consistent with
this Court’s long-standing precedent permitting
review of the constitutionality of execution methods,
a prisoner is entitled to relief from any
unconstitutional method of execution authorized by
a State legislature.
II. THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION
LIMITS
FEASIBLE
ALTERNATIVES TO THOSE ALREADY
DELINEATED BY STATE STATUTE
Like all States with the death penalty,
Arkansas’s execution statute provides for execution
by lethal injection. In 2012, the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruled that Arkansas’s vague lethal injection
statute violated the separation of powers doctrine,
which led to the current statute that identifies
specific types of execution drugs. Following this
Court’s decision in Glossip, an Arkansas court
determined that Petitioners here plausibly had
alleged that the State’s use of a certain drug
combination could cause extreme suffering.
Nonetheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
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Petitioners had failed to propose alternative
protocols that were “feasible” and “readily
implemented” because such alternatives were not
already written into the State statute.
In
combination, the Arkansas Supreme Court decisions
have served to insulate the State’s execution method
from judicial review.
A.

Arkansas’s
Adoption
And
Implementation Of Lethal Injection

Arkansas first adopted lethal injection as its
primary method of execution in 1983. See Lauren E.
Murphy, Third Time’s a Charm: Whether Hobbs v.
Jones Inspired a Durable Change to Arkansas's
Method of Execution Act, 66 ARK. L. REV. 813, 813
(2013). The move to lethal injection followed a
twenty-three year suspension on executions, which
began with Governor Winthrop Rockefeller’s
moratorium in 1967, his grant of clemency to all
fifteen men on death row in 1970, and this Court’s
holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See Murphy, supra, 66 ARK. L. REV. at 813.5

Arkansas’s history of executions also has faced public
scrutiny.
Shortly after the moratorium was lifted,
Arkansas executed Ricky Ray Rector, who shot himself in
the head prior to trial and suffered severe brain damage
as a consequence. See Roberta M. Harding, “Endgame”:
Competency and the Execution of Condemned Inmates—A
Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition
Against the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 105 (1994).
This
controversial execution led to public backlash because
many considered it contrary to both State and federal law
5
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Prior to 2013, Arkansas’s method-of-execution
statute delegated discretion to the Director of the
Department of Corrections to “determine the
substances to be uniformly administered and the
procedures to be used in any execution.” See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (2009). In 2012, the Arkansas
Supreme Court decided Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d
844 (Ark. 2012), which held the existing method-ofexecution statute unconstitutional on its face as
violating separation of powers. Id. at 854 (“[T]he
legislature has abdicated its responsibility and
passed to the executive branch, in this case the
[corrections department], the unfettered discretion
to determine all protocol and procedures, most
notably the chemicals to be used, for a state
execution.”).
Subsequently, the Arkansas legislature amended
the statute twice, once to address the separation of
powers concerns and a second time to alter the drug
cocktail to be used in executions. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-617 (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617
(2013). The current Arkansas statute requires that
a prisoner be executed with an intravenous injection
of a barbiturate or a sequence of midazolam,
vecuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (2015). The statute provides
for an alternative of electrocution, but only if
prohibiting the execution of prisoners with severe mental
deficiencies. See Peter Applebome, Arkansas Execution
Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/25/us/1992campaign-death-penalty-arkansas-execution-raisesquestions-governor-s.html.
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“execution by lethal injection under this section is
invalidated by a final and unappealable court order.”
Id. § 5-4-617 (k).
B.

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s
Decision Relies Exclusively On
Glossip’s Known And Available
Alternative Standard To Hold That
An Alternative Is Available Only If
It Is Included In The State Statute

Petitioners here have challenged the sequence of
drugs that the legislature has developed.
The
method, known as the “Midazolam Protocol,” is a
three-drug lethal injection consisting of 500
milligrams of midazolam, 100 milligrams of
vecuronium bromide, and 240 milligrams of
potassium chloride. Petitioners argued that the
Midazolam Protocol is likely to cause extreme pain
and that five safer means of execution were feasible
and readily available.
The Arkansas trial court found evidence that the
Midazolam Protocol would cause a constitutionally
unacceptable level of pain. Cert. Pet. App. 57a.
Petitioners submitted an affidavit from a doctor of
pharmacology who detailed the “ceiling effect” for
midazolam that occurs below the 500 milligram dose
with which Arkansas indicated it intends to inject
Petitioners. Id. at 71a; Cert. Pet. 5. In other words,
the midazolam injection would fail to render inmates
unconscious before injection with the other two
drugs, which undisputedly cause torturous pain.
Cert. Pet. App. 71a (noting that “a prisoner sedated
only with midazolam would experience intense pain
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and suffering from the administration of vecuronium
bromide and potassium chloride, but be unable to
communicate his distress”). The trial court found
that Petitioners sufficiently pleaded that midazolam
may not completely render an individual
unconscious, making him prone to a substantial risk
of intolerable pain. Id. at 71a–72a (“[T]he authority
to execute Plaintiffs’ death sentences . . . does not
render Plaintiffs helpless to protect themselves from
being put to death with lethal injection drugs and
using a protocol that will subject them to a
substantial risk of pain.”).
Ignoring the finding regarding a substantial risk
of intolerable pain, the Arkansas Supreme Court
dismissed Petitioners’ constitutional challenge in a
4-3 vote. In doing so, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that Petitioners had failed to satisfy their
Eighth Amendment burden to plead alternatives
under Baze and Glossip. Id. at 15a. The court first
analyzed Petitioners’ identification of alternate
drugs for use in the protocol, determining that an
allegation that such drugs are “generally available
on the open market” was irrelevant as to whether
the Arkansas Department of Corrections could
obtain the drugs. Id. at 19a. Without such a
showing, the proposed drug protocols could not be
considered “feasible” or “readily implemented” under
Baze and Glossip. Id.
Next,
the
court
examined
Petitioners’
identification of execution by firing squad as a
feasible alternative. While the Arkansas Supreme
Court purported to adopt this Court’s “standards
enunciated in both Baze and Glossip,” id. at 13a–
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14a, the Arkansas Supreme Court imposed the
additional requirement that an alternative qualifies
as “available” for Eighth Amendment purposes only
if it is already written into the State statute, id. at
20a. On this ground, the court rejected Petitioners’
identification of the firing squad as an alternative
method, which Petitioners’ alleged would result in
instantaneous and painless death and for which
Petitioners pleaded that the Arkansas Department
of Corrections had the firearms, bullets, and
personnel available to carry out an execution. Id. at
19a. The court suggested that, because this method
“is not identified in the statute as an approved
means of carrying out a sentence of death,” it is
therefore not “a readily implemented and available
option to the present method of execution.” Id. at
20a; see also id. (holding that, absent statutory
authorization, “it cannot be said that the use of a
firing squad is a readily implemented and available
option to the present method of execution”). The
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the
Petitioners failed to satisfy the “known and available
alternative” requirement under Glossip, resulting in
dismissal of the Petitioners’ challenge. Id.
III. MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
EXECUTION METHODS REQUIRES
CONSIDERATION
OF
NONSTATUTORY ALTERNATIVES
The requirement that a prisoner identify a
feasible and readily available alternate execution
method already in the State statute effectively
precludes Eighth Amendment review. Such an
approach directly conflicts with this Court’s prior
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execution method cases. Allowing each State to
determine the available methods of execution,
regardless of their constitutionality, would fracture
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, leading to
varying outcomes based solely on geography. While
judicial review historically has served as a catalyst
for States to adopt more humane methods of
execution, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach
would thwart the development of more humane
methods of execution.
A.

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s
Decision
Conflicts
With
This
Court’s Precedents

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision directly
conflicts with this Court’s precedents. Although
neither Baze nor Glossip holds that an execution
alternative must be State-authorized, the Arkansas
Supreme Court has imposed such a requirement.
But a State’s refusal to adopt a constitutional
execution method is, in fact, the very conduct that
leads to an Eighth Amendment violation under Baze
and Glossip. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 50; Glossip, 135
S. Ct. at 2737. To require that the “feasible and
readily implemented” inquiry take into account a
State legislature’s approval of an execution
alternative would eviscerate judicial review for
execution method challenges.
This Court has reaffirmed that a State violates
the Eighth Amendment when there exists a
“substantial risk of serious harm” or an “objectively
intolerable risk of harm” to an inmate through use of
a particular execution method. Baze, 553 U.S. at 50;
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Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2737. A court addressing such
a challenge may analyze whether the risk of harm is
“substantial when compared to a known and
available alternative method of execution.” Glossip,
135 S. Ct. at 2738. That comparison is not limited to
statutory alternatives. See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52, 61.
If it were so limited, then this Court’s framework for
analysis would allow a State to skew the comparison
through its selection—or elimination—of statutory
alternatives.
This Court’s decisions in Baze and Glossip
plainly prevent States from limiting the scope of
constitutional review in this manner. This Court
explicitly held in Baze that “[i]f a State refuses to
adopt such an alternative in the face of these
documented advantages, without a legitimate
penological justification for adhering to its current
method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change
its method can be viewed as ‘cruel and unusual’
under the Eighth Amendment.” Baze, 553 U.S. at
52. Under Baze and Glossip, whether a method of
execution is feasible and readily implemented is a
separate issue from whether a State legislature
considered, put to a vote, and passed a statute
enabling the State to employ the alternative. See
Arthur, 2016 WL 6500595, at *45 (Wilson, J.,
dissenting). The Arkansas Supreme Court, however,
conflated these two distinct aspects of Baze by
determining that an alternative is “unavailable” if it
does not appear in the State’s statute, despite
“documented advantages.” See Arthur, 2016 WL
6500595, at *50 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“Those are
clearly distinct inquiries. An alternative can have
the documented advantages of being feasible and
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readily implemented even though a state refuses to
adopt the alternative.”).
Because this Court’s decisions hold that the
relevant inquiry is the State’s “refus[al] to adopt” an
alternative, Baze, 553 U.S. at 52, the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting inmates from
relying on non-statutory alternatives directly
conflicts with Baze and Glossip.
B.

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s
Decision
Fractures
Eighth
Amendment Jurisprudence

Accepting the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
construction of Baze and Glossip also would lead to
inconsistent outcomes, allowing prisoners in some
States to challenge their method of execution under
the Eighth Amendment, but eliminating this right
for others. Under this approach, an inmate could be
executed in one State by use of an unduly painful
method ruled unconstitutional in another State
simply because the first State’s statute provided for
a feasible alternate method while the second State’s
statute did not. Mere geography should not dictate
the contours of the Eighth Amendment.
This Court has made clear that “there is an
important need for uniformity in federal law.”
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); Vacco
v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (“States must treat
like cases alike.”). Forcing prisoners to point to a
preexisting method of execution in a State’s statute
would lead to varying outcomes based on the State in
which the prisoner was convicted. In fifteen States,
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lethal injection is the only statutory method of
execution. Cert. Pet. 12 n.6. Five of these States—
Colorado, Mississippi, Montana, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania—provide a specific combination of
drugs that should be used. Id. at 12 n.7. In these
five States, plaintiffs would be barred from
advancing any alternative execution method under
the rule the Arkansas Supreme Court advanced, as
the respective State statutes provide only one option.
The remaining ten State statutes do not specify the
drugs to be used and instead delegate the exact
lethal injection protocol to department of corrections
personnel. Prisoners in these States may continue to
challenge lethal injection protocols, but may be
restricted in such challenges by the types of drugs
(e.g., a “paralytic agent”) required by the statute.
Of the remaining sixteen States that have
method-of-execution statutes, fifteen provide only
one other option in the statute. Id. Seven of these
fifteen States provide the only alternative as
electrocution. Id. Three of these States include the
only alternative as hanging. Id. Both of these
methods of execution have been basically abandoned
in recent years due to their barbaric and inhumane
nature. See supra Section I. Yet the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s interpretation would restrict
prisoners to precisely these alternatives.
Effectively, if the State statute restricts the
scope of Eighth Amendment review, then the Eighth
Amendment will have different meanings in
different States. This Court could not have intended
its decisions in Glossip and Baze to result in such a
patchwork application of the Eighth Amendment.

25
C.

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s
Decision
Creates
Perverse
Incentives For State Legislatures

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach also
has the potential to—and, indeed, foreshadows the
likelihood that it will—inhibit the development of
more humane methods of execution.
Not only would the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
construction of Glossip and Baze leave Eighth
Amendment
jurisprudence
inconsistent
and
incoherent, it also would prevent prisoners from
proposing more humane methods of execution.
Under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s approach, a
State may pass legislation severely limiting
alternative methods to render it impossible for an
inmate to meet the comparative analysis. If a State
statute only provides for one excruciatingly painful
method of execution, a prisoner could not plead an
Eighth Amendment violation because no alternative
method would be “feasible and readily available.” As
a result, prisoners could never challenge the State’s
execution protocol.
The detrimental consequences of such an
interpretation are easily identifiable. The threat of
judicial review of a particular method of execution
prompts legislatures to move toward less barbaric
methods. Legislatures will lack incentives to enact
more humane methods of execution because
prisoners would be left with no recourse to challenge
the manner in which they are put to death absent an
existing statutory alternative. State statutes could
remain completely stagnant in a deliberate effort to
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insulate States from constitutional challenges. And,
in fact, instead of encouraging States to adopt more
humane methods of execution—as prior judicial
review of execution methods has done—the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of Baze
and Glossip would permit States to adopt more
restrictive and barbarous method-of-execution
statutes with the specific intent of thwarting judicial
review. In effect, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s
opinion converts this Court’s test set forth in Baze
and Glossip—a test designed to protect the
constitutional rights of those facing the death
penalty—into a means of avoiding judicial review of
potential violations of those rights. The Baze and
Glossip Courts did not intend such a result.
CONCLUSION
This Court should grant the petition for
certiorari and summarily reverse the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s decision.
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